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CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE:
DETERMINING AUTHORITY TOWARDS A
STRICTLY CATEGORICAL APPROACH AND
DEMONSTRATING POTENTIAL PLEA BARGAIN

IMPLICATIONS
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully
consider the text of the law before [he or she commits a
crime], it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given
to the world in language that the common world will
understandof what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, an estimated 11.7 million undocumented immigrants were
living in the United States. 2 Due to the continued growth of the immigrant
population, state criminal defense attorneys, judges, and prosecutors are
increasingly faced with difficult decisions concerning the federal
immigration consequences of a state criminal conviction, specifically
deportation.' Today, given the severity of deportation as a civil penalty,
noncitizens may be 4more concerned with the possibility of exile versus a
criminal conviction.
When classifying repercussions of criminal convictions, the phrase
"crimes involving moral turpitude" ("CIMT") has been utilized in
immigration law for over one hundred years without a statutory definition,
1 McBoylev. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
2 Jeffrey S. Passel et. al., Population Decline of UnauthorizedImmigrants Stalls, May Have

Reversed, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER
HISPANIC
TRENDS
(Sept.
23, 2013),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stallsmay-have-reversed/ (providing statistics for unauthorized immigrants in the United States).
3 See id (discussing deportations have risen with immigrants violating United States laws).
4 See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (discussing severity of deportation
when defendant believes himself citizen); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 377-78

(2010) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[P]roviding advice on whether a
conviction for a particular offense will make an alien removable is often quite complex."). The
Supreme Court has explained that, "deportation is an integral part indeed, sometimes the most
important part of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to
specified crimes." Padilla,559 U.S. at 364. Additionally, in Padillathe Supreme Court held that

the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to advise noncitizen defendants about the
deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Id. at 372 (discussing holding).
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continuously blurring the boarders between criminal and immigration law.5
With significant immigration reform on the forefront of the Obama
Administration's agenda, the importance of outstanding ambiguities
surrounding CIMTs emerge from the limelight once again.6 Current
immigration statutes still lack a concrete legal standard for classifying what
crimes involve moral turpitude and, accordingly, fail to inform non-citizens
what crimes constitute deportable offenses. 7 Adding to the confusion, the
United States Courts of Appeals remain split as to what the correct
methodology is to determine what constitutes moral turpitude, applying
either the categorical approach, the modified categorical approach, or the
Silva-Trevino Doctrine.8
While the Supreme Court rejected to define moral turpitude or
otherwise find the terminology void for ambiguity, the Supreme Court did
uphold the application of the categorical approach in immigration
proceedings in Moncrieffe v. Holder.9 Following the Moncrieffe decision,
the ongoing validity of Silva-Trevino and certain Board precedent is
questionable.1O Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in OlivasMotta v. Holder and the Fifth Circuit's opinion vacating Silva-Trevino,
widened the circuit split toward a strict application of the categorical
approach, directly rejecting the Attorney General's realistic probability

test."i

5 See Laura E. Neish & Keisha Stanford, Supreme Court Tackles Aggravated Felonies in

'Moncrieffe ', NEW YORK LAW
JOURNAL
(Aug.
5,
2013),
available at
http://www.zuckennan.com/media/publication/328_NeishStanford NYL SupremeCourtlackle
sAggmvatedFelonies.pdf (describing complicated nature of integrating criminal and immigration
law).
6

See Julia Preston, Senators Of/er a New Blueprintfor Immigration, N.Y. TES, Jan. 28,

2013, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/us/politics/senators-agree-onblueprint-for-immigration.html?_r-0 (commenting on introduction of bipartisan blueprint to
address failing of immigration reform).

7 See Nate Carter, Comment, Shocking the Conscience of Mankind: Using InternationalLaw

to Define "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude" In ImmigrationLaw, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.

955, 959 (2006) (explaining state statute's description of prohibited action and failure to identify
deportable offenses).
See infra Parts I-11 (examining how varying approaches are utilized by different courts).
9 See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1686-87 (2013) (upholding strict categorical
approach fully applicable in immigration proceedings). Notably, this decision discussed the
applicability to the strict categorical approach in regards to determining whether a crime
constituted an aggravated felony and not in the context of CIMvTs. See id. at 1689.
10 See infra Part III.B (discussing impact of Silva-Trevino on Supreme Court rulings).
See Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 916 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing analysis of
circuit split); see also Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding judge
may not look at extrinsic evidence to determine if defendant's conviction was CIMT).
Procedurally, even though the Fifth Circuit has remanded the very case in which the Attorney
General established the realistic probability approach, which permits examination of evidence
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Part II of this Note will discuss the historical background of
CIMTs, including immigration statutory reform, various definitions
adopted by courts when referring to a CIMT, and the different approaches
available to determining authority when prosecutorial discretion is
required. 12 Part III will address the impact of Moncrieffe and Olivas-Motta
on the Silva-Trevino approach and the divide in the circuit courts.13
Finally, Part IV will discuss impending immigration law reform's potential
implications for practitioners, specifically in the context of negotiating plea

bargains. 14
II.

HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF MORAL
TURPITUDE IN THE IMMIGRATION LAW CONTEXT

A. The History of Statutory Moral Turpitude
The term CIMT first appeared in the immigration context in 1891,
when an act made aliens excludable if convicted of a "crime involving
moral turpitude". 15 In 1903 and 1907, Congress expanded this provision to
encompass exclusion or deportation of noncitizens that had been either
convicted of or admitted to the commission of a crime or misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude. 16 Subsequently, in response to public concern
with alien criminal activity, the Immigration Act of 1917 was established17
and for the first time CIMTs were used to trigger deportation actions.
The phraseology has continued to appear in immigration statutes, with

outside the record of conviction, the Attorney General's decision still stands. See infra note 72
and accompanying text (noting Seventh and Eighth Circuits adopted Attorney General's opinion
as reasonable interpretation).
12 See infra Part II (discussing historical background of CIIMIT in Immigration Law).
13 See infra Part III (detailing CRT circuit split).
14 See infra Part IV (explaining impact of CIMT on immigration reform and plea bargains).
15 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084 (issuing exclusion of aliens "who have
been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude").
The purpose of the 1891 Act was to more clearly distinguish desirable from undesirable
immigrants, however, with all relevant immigration laws lacking a concrete definition of what
constitutes an offense of CIMT to trigger deportability, this purpose may be inherently frustrated.
See Brian C. Harms, Redefining "Crimes of Moral Turpitude ":A proposalto Congress, 15 GEO.

L.J. 259, 263-64 (2001) (discussing how 1891 Act left CRT undefined and history of
common law failures to define).
16 See Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1021, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214 (adding "moral turpitude"
language to classes of aliens excluded from United States admission); Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch.
1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 899 (broadening grounds by excluding noncitizens convicted of or
admitting to CIMT).
17 See Hams, supra note 15, at 260-62 (detailing history of immigration reform).
IMMIGR.
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application in both exclusion and deportation actions.18
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA") initiated the
modem era of immigration reform.19 The INA was designed give structure
to what was previously an ad hoc assortment of immigration standards, and
today stands as the basis for all federalimmigrationpolicy. 20 The INA was
an unprecedented revision of existing immigration law, largely devised in
response to fears of communist infiltration. 2' It decreased executive access
to suspend deportation actions and severely broadened what made an alien
eligible for deportation.2 2 The INA once again addressed moral turpitude,
modifying provisions of prior Acts 2and
removing references to the specific
3
turpitude.
moral
involve
that
crimes
In 1983, the Department of Justice established the Executive Office
for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), which reorganized the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") by combining their review with the

18 See id. at 263 (examining immigration law from 1917 to present).
19 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). The
INA was thereafter codified and amended in various sections of Title Eight of the United States
Code. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration ModernizationAct Hearing
on S. 744 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6 (2013) (modernizing legal
immigration framework to address American needs).
20 See
EDWARD
PRINCE
HUTCHINSON,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY: 1798-1965 80 (1981) (discussing initial purpose of
INA). Notably, the INA affords circuit courts jurisdiction to review orders of removal. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2012).
21 Kati L. Griffith, Article, Perfecting Public Immigration Legislation: Private
Immigration
Bills andDeportableLawful PermanentResidents, 18 GEO. IMMiGR. L.J. 273, 280 (Winter 2004)
(stating INA significantly expanded crimes and misdemeanors making alien excludable from
entry and deportable). The initial legislative purpose of the INA in the context of impending
legislative reform as the need for immigration regulation has changed. See id. at 286 ("[P]rivate
bills tended to decrease after loosening of restrictive immigration laws."); see also HUTCHINSON,
supra note 20, at 80.
22 See Griffith, supra note 21, at 280 (addressing effects of INA on immigrants and executive
action).
23 See Derrick Moore, Note, "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude ": Why
the Void-ForVagueness Argument is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 813, 822
(2008) (discussing important changes Congress made to INA in 1952); see also Alina Das, The
Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in
Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1669, 1674-75 (2011) (indicating rationales
for categorical analysis apply with even greater force today than when first introduced). In
removing references to the specific crimes that involve moral turpitude, the 1952 Act thereby
established moral turpitude as the new standard for determining denial of entry or removal. See
Nathanael C. Crowley, Comment, Naked Dishonesty: Misuse of a Social Security Number for an
Otherwise Legal Purpose May Not Be a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude After All, 15 SAN
DIEGO INT'L L.J. 205, 214 (2013) (recognizing "moral turpitude became the single highest cause
of visa refusals" following 1952 Act). "Additionally, the act broadened the power to exclude;
aliens who had committed acts which constitute the essential elements of crimes of moral
turpitude became inadmissible." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Immigration Judge function previously performed by the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). 24 The EOIR administers
the United States' immigration court system and primarily decides whether
foreign-born individuals, who are charged by the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") with violating immigration law, should be ordered
removed from the United States.25 Removal proceedings may be initiated
against a noncitizen with certain criminal convictions and are the starting
point of the adjudication process for determining whether the crime
involved moral turpitude.26 Under current immigration standards, a single
offense of CIMT is considered a deportable offense if the crime was
committed within five years after entry and resulted in a minimum sentence
of at least one year.27 Additionally, under the INA, an alien may be
deported if convicted of two or more CIMTs regardless of the length of
time spent in the United States, so long as
the crimes did not arise out of a
28
"single scheme of criminal misconduct.,
B. Differing Definitions ofMoral Turpitude
Despite the detrimental deportation implications of a CIMT
conviction, there have been no statutory modifications to the INA to
include a clear definition.2 9 In the absence of congressional guidance,
immigration officers, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), and
federal courts make the determination whether a convicted alien's crime
24 See EOIR at a Glance,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ExEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV.,

www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-at-a-glance (last updated Feb. 13, 2015) (describing establishment of
EOIR and function).
25 See id (giving general overview of immigration removal proceedings). The BIA is the
highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws and has nationwide
jurisdiction to hear appeals from certain decisions rendered by immigration judges. See Board of
Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ExEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV.,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last updated Feb. 6, 2015). BIA decisions are binding
on immigration judges unless overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court. Id. Most
BIA decisions are subject to judicial review in the federal courts. Id.
26 See Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving Moral
Turpitude After Silva- Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 320 (2011) (describing removal
proceedings in Department of Justice).
27 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (rendering alien deportable upon conviction of
crime involving moral turpitude); see also Harms, supra note 15, at 263-64 (explaining procedure
of CIMT deportation).
28 See § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii); see also Harms, supra note 15, at 263-64 (articulating different
contexts CIMT is used in INA).
29 See Jordanv. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1951) (acknowledging difficulty of CIMT
definition while still finding fraud always qualifies). The Court also noted that despite the fact
that the "void for vagueness" test only applies to criminal statutes, they would apply the analysis
to this case due "the grave consequences of deportation." Id. at 231.
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does or does not involve moral turpitude according to their respective
definitions.3 0 However, in accordance with Chevron v. Natural Resource
Defense Council, because the statute does not implicitly state which crimes
constitute a CIMT, Congress implicitly left the scope of the phrase for the
BIA to establish.3 '
While judges typically frown upon using generic dictionary
definitions in courtrooms, they provide a necessary starting point when
examining what constitutes a CIMT. g2 Merriam-Webster Dictionary
defines moral turpitude as an inherent baseness or depravity, while Black's
Law Dictionary defines CIMTs as conduct that is contrary to justice,
honesty, or morality. 3 Although Congress failed to offer a precise
definition of "moral turpitude," most courts define moral turpitude as "an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which
a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. 4

30

See Annotation, What Constitutes "Crime Involving Moral Turpitude" Within Meaning of

§ 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 US.C.A. § 1182(a)(9),
1251(a)(4)), and Similar PredecessorStatutes Providingfor Exclusion or Deportation of Aliens
Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480 (2015) [hereinafterALR] (stating BIA and federal
courts are determining authority).
31 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (announcing
deference principle courts must use when reviewing construction administrative agencies gives to
statutes). Under Chevron, if Congress has directly addressed the issue, its intent controls. Id. at
842-43. However, if Congress has not directly addressed the issue, the court must look to the
"administrative interpretation' and decide whether their ruling lends itself to a "permissible
construction of the statute." Id.at 843. Only if there is no administrative interpretation may the
court prescribe their own. Id. Agency decisions are afforded deference by the courts, so in order
for courts to reject the Attorney General's interpretation of the INA, they must determine if the
interpretation was arbitrary and capricious, or vague. See Dadhania, supra note 26, at 322 n.48
(discussing statutory interpretation of CIMT). Where a statute is ambiguous and an implementing
agency's construction is reasonable, "Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency's
construction of the statute, even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the
best statutory interpretation." Id. at 322 n.46. Therefore, because Congress has clearly delegated
the authority to interpret the INA to the Attorney General, circuit court precedent will not prevail
over his interpretation. See id at 323 (providing basis for Congress's delegation of power to
Attorney General); see also Harms, supra note 15, at 274-75 (discussing Chevron deference).
Arguably, Congress has refused to define CIMTs, the responsibility to provide a definition was
passed on to the INS. See Harms, supra note 15, at 274 (arguing INS bears responsibility of
defining "crimes involving moral turpitude").
32 See Masha Heifetz, Mens Rea, Gravity of Harm, and the Classification of Crimes
Involving Moral Turpitude, 12-18 BENDER'S JMMIGR. BULL. 02 (2007) (citing necessity for
concrete definition of CIMT).
33 See id.
34 ALR, supra note 30 (citing definition cited by First, Second Third, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits). The long-established BIA definition includes a crime committed recklessly and
with a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the life and safety of others.
Id.
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While determining authority frequently references in its decisions that the
term CIMT is ambiguous,
the Supreme Court concluded it was not void
35
due to this ambiguity.
Once the appropriate definition of moral turpitude is ascertained
with respect to corresponding federal law, it is applied in the context of
immigration removal proceedings.3 6 If an alien has been convicted of a
state crime, an officer of Homeland Security reviews the conviction.3 7 The
Code of Federal Regulations ("CFR") indicates that the reviewing officer
must base classification on "the moral standards generally prevailing in the
United States. 38 An alien is then permitted to appeal a determination of a
CIMT to the BIA and may further appeal the BIA decision to the
corresponding federal district court.39 If the district court holds that a
finding of CIMT was improper-procedurally
or otherwise-the alien is no
40
longer subject to deportation.
C. The DeterminingAuthority's Methodology for Classifying CIMT
Immigration courts do not typically conduct an independent
investigation of criminal conduct, but rather rely on what happened in a
criminal court as the basis for deportation.4 i With determining authority
still lacking a concrete definition of moral turpitude, they employ different
modem approaches to determining its presence. 42
First, the categorical approach examines the generic definition of
the offense committed by the alien as defined by the statute.43 In this first
35 See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (holding CIMT not void for
vagueness).
36 See infra Part II.C (describing different approaches to applying CIIMIT analysis and

variations by circuit).
37 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2012). While the INA does not define good moral character, it
provides categories of conduct that preclude a noncitizen from demonstrating good moral
character. See id. (providing categories).
31 See 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a)(1) (2006). The requirement by the CFR naturally invites an
evolutionary definition of CIMTs, with morality standards constantly changing in the United
States. See Heifetz, supra note 32 (citing necessity for concrete definition of CIMT).
39 See EOIR at a Glance, supra note 24.
40 See id.
41 See Jesse Lloyd, The "CategoricalApproach ", "Modified CategoricalApproach ", and
How the Ninth Circuit's Young v. Holder Modifies the Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Convictions (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.beancard.com/blog/2012/09/the-categorical-approachmodified-categorical-approach-and-how-the-ninth-circuits-young-v-holder-mod. shtml
(sharing
impact of Young v. Holder on immigration consequences of criminal convictions).
42 See Crowley, supra note 23, at 214-17 (describing statutory reform of moral turpitude in
INA of 1952).
43 See Katherine Brady, Moncrieffe and Olivas-Motta: Fourteen CrimImm Defenses in the
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step of analysis, as outlined in the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v.
United States, considers only the statutory elements of the crime. 44
Accordingly, the classification of CIMT does not depend on facts from the

alien's record of conviction, but rather "whether the statute of conviction
necessarily, in every case, requires a finding of conduct that triggers the
later federal consequence." 4 5 Under this standard, the full range of conduct
penalized by the criminal statute must fall within the meaning of the
generic definition for a finding of CIMT. 46 In other words, the elements of
the crime convicted of must necessarily inhere moral turpitude 47
.
How to determine whether a crime necessarily inheres moral
turpitude differs jurisdictionally, as the majority of circuits apply either the

least culpable conduct test or the realistic probability test. 48 The least
culpable conduct test considers whether moral turpitude would inhere in
the minimum conduct sufficient to satisfy the elements of the offense.49
Alternatively, the realistic probability test, first established by the Supreme
Court in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, considers whether there is more than
a hypothetical probability that the criminal statute could be applied to

conduct that does not involve moral turpitude.50

Significantly, the test

Ninth Circuit, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER 2 (July 15, 2013), available at
http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/moncrieffe-ninth cir defenses final_5.28.pdf
(explaining
basic application of categorical approach).
44 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592-94 (1990) (justifying differing definitions
of term burglary from criminal code); see also Crowley, supra note 23, at 218 (emphasizing pure
categorical inquiry of first part of analysis). "The goal of the categorical approach is to effectuate
a federal standard to ensure that state law does not take precedence in immigration proceedings."
Crowley, supra note 23, at 218 (noting purpose of categorical approach); see Das, supra note 23,
at 1676-77 (outlining Court's application of categorical approach in Taylor).
45 Dan Kesselbrenner et al., Decamps v. United States and the Modified Categorical
Approach,
NAT'L
IMMIGR.
PROJECT
(July
17,
2013),
http://www.nationalimnmigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice-advisories/cdjpa Descamps_
Practice Advisory_7-17-2013.pdf (sharing individual record of conviction not relevant in
determining CIMT, but statute); see Brady, supra note 43 (explaining basic application of
categorical approach).
46 See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009) (indicating that categorical approach does
not apply to "circumstance-specific" factors).
47 See Dadhania, supra note 26, at 326 (discussing circuit split).
48 See Jennifer Lee Koh- The Whole Better Than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical
Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257,
283-85 (2012) (listing circuits following realistic probability test versus least culpable conduct
test for first step of categorical approach).
49 See id. (recognizing Second, Third, and Fifth Circuit decisions).
50 See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (creating realistic probability
test); see also infra Part III (detailing realistic probability test). The Attorney General and
Seventh Circuits have consistently applied the realistic probability test. See, e.g., In re SilvaTrevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689-90 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding realistic probability is the correct
standard to use in immigration context), vacated 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (B.I.A. 2015); Mata-
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determining authority applies impacts the ease that the government may
deport aliens, as the realistic probability test is more favorable towards a
finding of CIMT.5 '
If under the applicable standard, the determining authority cannot
categorically make a finding of CIMT after examining the criminal statute
alone, the analysis proceeds using a modified categorical approach.52 This
occurs when a noncitizen is convicted of a multi-offense statute as
determining authority cannot perform a categorical analysis without
establishing which particular offense the alien committed.53 If all of the
offenses contained within the statute may separately be categorically
recognized as a CIMT, no further inquiry by determining authority is
necessary. 54
However, if even one crime in a multi-crime statute fits the generic
definition, the investigation proceeds and determining authority may look
to the alien's reviewable record of conviction.5 5 This modified categorical
approach permits determining authority to look beyond the plain language
of the statute, but not to facts outside of the record of conviction.56 The
sole purpose of looking at the record of conviction must be to determine
which offense within the statute was committed.5 7 Despite the Taylor
decision and over one hundred years of authority, several circuits have
applied a less stringent standard that permitted use of some facts from the
record of conviction.58
Other courts carved out exceptions to the
Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying realistic probability test).
51 See Koh, supra note 48, at 283-85 (explaining impact of different approaches on
deportation).
52 See Kesselbrenner et al., supra note 45 (discussing impact of Descamps v. United States
on modified categorical approach).
" See id.
54 See Dadhania, supra note 26, at 326-27 (explaining CRT procedure). The lack of
ambiguity in a criminal statute, even if it is divisible, necessitates a finding of CR1T, which may
be appealed if the alien so choses. Id.
55 See Brady, supra note 43, at 5 (indicating what documents permitted for review as part of
record of conviction).
56 See Crowley, supra note 23, at 220 (characterizing differences between categorical
approach and modified categorical approach). A record of conviction includes documents such as
the indictment, judgment of conviction, jury instruction, plea, or plea transcript. See id.
57 See Brady, supra note 43, at 5 (describing how Moncreiffe reaffirmed permissibility to
review record of conviction when criminal statutes contains multiple crimes).
58 See Koh, supra note 48, at 283-85 (listing circuit courts with misguided application of
categorical approach in classifying CIMTs). In light of the lax application of Taylor, the
Supreme Court issued several decisions clarifying their intent that a strict categorical approach
should be utilized in agency adjudications. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34-41 (2009)
(creating framework for more general application of categorical approach in removal
proceedings); Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 189-90 (2007) (citing lower courts'
consistent application of Taylor categorical approach when assessing whether convictions
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categorical approaches by distinguishing Taylor in the immigration context,
allowing consideration of limited facts outside the record of conviction.59
In 2008, in an attempt to clarify the confusion surround CIMTs, the
Silva-Trevino decision, issued by the Attorney General, offered a standard
definition of a CIMT, redefined the term "conviction," and, most notably,
instituted a third step to the categorical approach. 60 The Attorney General
found ambiguity in section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the INA, allowing the
agency to exercise its duty to provide an authoritative interpretation of the
statute. 61 First, the Attorney General acknowledged that while the BIA has
attempted to fill the statutory gaps which lack a definition of what
constitutes a CIMT, some courts still believe that their guidance has not
been clear enough.6 2 Accordingly, the decision qualifies a CIMT as
involving "both reprehensible conduct and some degree of scienter,
63
whether specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness.,
Additionally, the Attorney General sought to redefine the term
"conviction" to include conduct "committed" by the alien.64 Under §
1227(a)(2)(A)(i-ii), an alien is deportable only if he has been "convicted
of' CIMTs. By redefining the term "conviction," the Attorney General
reasoned that the immigration court could look outside the record of
conviction for evidence of CIMTs a noncitizen may have committed.6 5
The most controversial aspect of the Attorney General's decision is
the departure from well-established precedent to now permit immigration
judges to look at evidence outside the record of conviction.66 The ruling
laid out that immigration courts should continue to apply Taylor to
determine whether a crime is categorically a CIMT and, if the crime is not

constitute removal).
59 See Espinosa-Franco v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 2004) (considering victim's
age when assessing whether offense constituted aggravated felony).
60 See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689 n.1 (B.I.A. 2008) (instituting third step
to categorical approach through ambiguity in INA), vacated 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (B.I.A. 2015).
61 See Bria DeSalvo, A Split Among the Circuits: Taking Opposing Sides on Silva-Trevino,
IMMIGR. LAW ADVISOR (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Review), Oct. 2012,
at 1-2, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA-Newsleter/ILA%/ 202012/vol6no9.pdf
(analyzing circuit split on analysis of statutes).
62 See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 689 n.1 (discussing why BIA issued another
definition of CIMT).
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 697.
66 See Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2013) (criticizing analysis
provided in Silva-Trevino); see also Carrie Rosenbaum, Farewell to Silva-Trevino: Olivas-Motta
v.
Holder,
LEXIS
NExIS
(May
22,
2013),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/insidenews/
archive/2013/06/28/
farewell-to-silva-trevino-olivas-motta-v-holder.aspx (sharing holding of Olivas-Motta).
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categorically a CIMT, may apply the modified categorical approach to
determine if the conviction carries immigration consequences.6 7 However,
the decision instituted a third step-a step beyond the modified categorical
approach-allowing administrative courts to rely on alleged facts about the
alien's criminal conduct that were never established in the criminal case
record.6 8 If the question of whether a CIMT was committed remained
unanswered judges could now, "to the extent they deem it necessary and
appropriate, consider evidence beyond the formal record of conviction...
[including] any additional evidence of factfinding the adjudicator
determines is necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral
turpitude question., 69
III. OLIVAS-MOTTA AND THE DIVIDE AMONG THE CIRCUIT
COURTS
A. Olivas-Motta and the Fifth Circuit: Conviction

Conviction

The goal of the Attorney General in Silva-Trevino was to
standardize the patchwork of approaches to CIMT analysis across the
nation. 70 Despite the Attorney General's efforts, the decision had the
opposite effect, causing five federal circuit courts to directly reject the
contention that relevant provisions of the INA are ambiguous and,
therefore, do not owe Chevron deference to the decision. 71 To date, only
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have adopted the Attorney General's
opinion after finding the CIMT provision to be ambiguous and the
interpretation reasonable .72
67

See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 689-90 (adopting radically new framework for

determine whether conviction is one of moral turpitude).
68 See Circuit Split: Looking Beyond the Record to Determine Whether a Conviction Involves
"Moral
Turpitude ",
FEDERAL
EVIDENCE
REVIEW
(May
23,
2013),
http://federalevidence.com/blog/2013/may/circuit-split-looking-beyond-record-administrativeproceedings (detailing circuit split concerning application of Attorney General's decision in SilvaTrevino). A later decision explained that immigration adjudicators would still be required to
assess the statutory definition of the offense first, then review the record of conviction before
instituting. See In re Ahortalejo-Guzman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 465, 468 (B.I.A. 2011) (holding
immigration judges may not skip directly to third step of "categorical analysis").
69 In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690.
70 See DeSalvo, supra note 61, at 2 (discussing Attorney General's decision as attempt to
unify Circuits).
71

See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing Silva-Trevino). Thus far, the

Ninth, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have all concluded that Silva-Trevino was
wrongly decided. See supra note 48 (detailing different circuits decisions expressly rejecting
Silva-Trevino's third step).
72 See Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1055 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding because moral
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Olivas-Motta is arguably the most significant decision since Silva
Trevino.7'3 At the time the decision was rendered, the Ninth Circuit joined
the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuit, holding that the Silva-Trevino
application allowing immigration judges, in the absence of a categorical
approach, to "consult evidence outside the record of conviction in
determining whether an alien has been 'convicted of a CIMT. '7 4 The
Ninth Circuit specifically found that even if an ambiguity exists about a
crime, immigration courts may not look beyond the record of conviction to
determine whether the crime involves moral turpitude.75 The decision
expressly stated that under the administrative deference framework
announced in Chevron, the Attorney General had no choice but to do as
Congress mandated.76
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Fifth Circuit recently
remanded the very case the Attorney General predicated his third step of

turpitude is not element of criminal convictions judges may look beyond facts of conviction); Ali
v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating appropriate classification of conviction
may require additional information); see also CircuitSplit, supra note 68 (analyzing decisions of
CR1T circuit split). Notably, the aforementioned circuits that adopted the Attorney General's
opinion did not delve into whether or not they supported the construction of 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), but instead found they were bound under Chevron to follow because a
reasonable construction revealed a decision that was neither arbitrary nor capricious. See Circuit
Split, supra note 68.
73 Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding defendant subject
to
removal given CIMT convictions). The first conviction occurred in 2003 for facilitating unlawful
possession of marijuana and the second conviction in 2007 for "commit[ing] endangerment by
recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death." Id. at 908.
While possession of marijuana is clearly defined as a CR1T, the second conviction made no
findings that it was a CR1T. Cf
74 Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 910 (quoting In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (B.I.A.
2008), vacated 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (B.I.A.2015)); see Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 482
(4th Cir. 2012) (holding plain language is not ambiguous because relevant statutory language
refers to convictions not conduct); Sanchez Fajardo v. U.S. Att'y. Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1309-10
(11th Cir. 2011) (deciding "convicted of' is unambiguous and agreeing with Third Circuit that
C1T describes generic crimes); Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 474 (3d Cir. 2009)
(finding it "could not be clearer" from statute C1T focuses on conviction not specific acts); see
also CircuitSplit, supra note 68 (analyzing decisions of CIMT circuit split).
75 See Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 916 (concluding method immigration courts use to
determine crimes of moral turpitude is not ambiguous); see also Rosenbaum, supra note 66
(discussing holding of case).
76 See Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d at 916 (indicating focus is on Congress' intent when reviewing
agency's construction of statute). Chevron requires deference to agency decisions provided that
the statute delegating authority to the agency is clear, direct, and unambiguous. Id. Accordingly,
as the Ninth Circuit held the statute was unambiguous, the court was permitted to hold that the
Attorney General could not reinterpret the method by which immigration courts determine
whether a crime involves moral turpitude and do not have to pay Silva-Trevino deference. Id. at
918 (stating courts must apply Taylor's categorical and Shepard's modified categorical
approach).
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reasoning upon. 7 7 In Silva-Trevino, the Fifth Circuit reiterated reasoning
derived from Chevron, explaining that where a statute is ambiguous and an
implementing agency's construction is reasonable, courts are required to
accept the agency's interpretation even if it is different from what the court
believes. 78 "Therefore, because Congress has clearly delegated to the
Attorney General the authority to resolve questions of law regarding the
INA, [court] precedent will prevail over his interpretation only if our
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion., 79 The Fifth Circuit went beyond
simply rejecting the Attorney General's reasoning that the court should
defer to his interpretation of INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i) in the interest of
uniform application of the law and further declared that the objective has

been counterproductive-replacing prior judicial accord with a circuit
80
split.

Practically, one of the most significant changes brought about by
the elimination of the third step of the Silva-Trevino analysis is that
determining authority can no longer rely on police reports when deciding

whether a conviction constitutes a CIMT. 81
B. The Impact of Silva-Trevino on Supreme Court Rulings
The Attorney General's decision has also had a significant impact

on recent Supreme Court rulings.8 2 In Moncrieffe, the U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed that the full categorical approach applies in immigration

77 See Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding SilvaTrevino approach inconsistent with unambiguous language of INA by permitting extrinsic
evidence outside conviction record).
78 See id. at 199 (agreeing that Chevron deference to AG's opinion in Silva-Trevino is not
owed).
79 Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 199 (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a statute is
ambiguous, "Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency's construction of the statute,
even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
interpretation." Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'nv. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005) (discussing Chevron deference); see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984).
80 See Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 205 (holding no Chevron deference where statute in
question is unambiguous).
81 See DeSalvo, supra note 61, at 2-3 (analyzing use of documents outside record of
conviction).
82 See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (reaffirming categorical approach);
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (cautioning of limited circumstances under
which modified categorical approach should be applied).
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proceedings.83 Under the Moncrieffe standard, unless the criminal statute is
an exact categorical match with the applicable generic definition, the
inquiry into whether the alien committed a CIMT stops and the alien
prevails. 8 4 The Court, however, did not expressly rule on whether courts
can review evidence outside the record of conviction to determine if a
noncitizen is eligible for relief when the record of conviction is ambiguous.
In Descamps, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
question of whether the modified categorical approach applies to statutes
that contain a single "indivisible" set of elements sweeping more broadly
than the corresponding generic offense.8 5 The Court found that the Ninth
Circuit's broad application of the modified categorical approach violated
the statutory requirement of a conviction and that "Congress intended the
sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant has been
convicted
of
falling. within
undelyig
th crimes
"
,,86 certain categories, and not the facts
underlying the prior convictions.
IV. IMMIGRATION REFORM AND WHY COURTS MUST
CONSIDER PLEA BARGAIN IMPLICATIONS
With five circuits now directly rejecting the Attorney General's
holding that evidence outside of the record of conviction is permissible in
situations where the modified categorical approach fails to reveal if the
offense necessarily inheres moral turpitude, the discussion may justifiably
switch to what will occur if all circuits align against the decision.8 7 There
is still a distinct possibility that every circuit may eventually come to the
same conclusion that INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i) is unambiguous and, therefore,
not owe the decision deference under Chevron.88 Despite the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits utilization of the Attorney General's decision, it is applied

83

See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at1690 (reasoning full categorical approach consistent with text

of INA).
84 See Brady, supra note 43, at 4-5 (describing how Moncreiffe reaffirmed permissibility to
review conviction record when criminal statutes contains multiple crimes).
85 See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2293 ("A court may use the modified approach only to
determine which alternative element in a divisible statute formed the basis of the defendant's
conviction.").
86 Id. (outlining Court's reasoning); see Kesselbrenner et al., supra note 45, at 7 (discerning
Congress's intent behind Descamps).
87 See CircuitSplit, supra note 68 (referring to holding of Olivas-Motta).
88 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (listing majority of circuits reject Attorney
General's application of CIMT analysis). Now that the very decision which incited the Attorney
General's decision to apply a third step to the categorical approach has been over turned, it is
likely that the remaining circuits employing the third step will cease its practice as well. C(
Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 201 (5th Cir.2014)
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only through procedural necessity.8 9
Additionally, Moncrieffe and Descamps go a long way towards
clarifying the acceptable manners in which to apply the modified
categorical approach in the immigration context. 90 Because the Supreme
Court never discussed the BIA or deference in their ruling in Moncrieffe,
the applicability of their ruling in the immigration context becomes
questionable. 91 The BIA has worked around similar reasoning in Taylor,
asserting in a footnote that "Taylor... is not necessarily controlling on the
BIA because the BIA is entitled to deference on its interpretation of an
immigration statute, as long as it is reasonable."9 2
There are already indications that certain courts will not strictly
follow Descamps with the BIA permitting evidence outside of the record of
conviction and the Ninth Circuit supporting a more relaxed interpretation
of the modified categorical approach. 93 As seen in Lanferman, the BIA
decided that it could use the modified categorical approach more widely in
the immigration context than in the criminal context. 94 Courts will likely
argue that immigration cases are distinguishable from the circumstances in
Descamps as they were applied by the Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACAA"). 95 However, courts will have a harder time distinguishing the
result from Moncrieffe, as this case occurred within the immigration
context.96
While the categorical approach in immigration proceedings
similarly relates to penalties that arise out of a conviction of certain types
of crimes, the BIA in Lanferman held that they could apply the modified
categorical approach broadly even in situations where doing so would be
impermissible under the ACCA.9 7 Accordingly, it will be necessary for
89 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (outlining cases declaring statutory clarity).

90 See Kesselbrenner et al., supra note 45, at 7-10 (discussing impact of Descamps on

modified categorical approach).
91 See Brady, supra note 43, at 4-5 (discussing implications of Moncrieffe decision in
immigration context).
92 See Kesselbrenner et al., supra note 45, at 8.
93 See In re Lanferman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 721, 728 (B.I.A. 2012), abrogated by Flores v.
Holder, 779 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2015) (demonstrating discretion for courts allowing certain
evidence from administrative record).
94 See id. at 728 ("[T]he categorical approach itself need not be applied with the same rigor
in the immigration context as in the criminal arena.").
95 See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (asserting modified categorical
approach cannot apply in cases involving ACCA).
96 See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (applying categorical CIMvIT analysis in
immigration context).
97 See In re Lanferman, 25 1. & N. Dec. at 728 ("Adopting the broadest of the three outlined
approaches is also consistent with the view we share with some courts of appeal .... ; see also
Kesselbrenner et al., supra note 45 (stating broad modified approach should only apply when
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individual circuit courts to address the applicability of Descamps in the
immigration context if the Immigration Courts do not align the Supreme
Court's decision and this criminal case is equally applicable to the
categorical approach used in immigration proceedings.9 8
While neither Olivas-Motta nor the Fifth Circuit in Silva-Trevino
directly relied on either Moncrieffe or Descamps in reaching their
decisions, the findings are consistent, fundamentally undercutting the
Attorney General's decision. 99 Due to Congress' plenary power to
controlimmigration,
"[t]he
scope
of
judicial
inquiry
intoimmigrationlegislation is exceedingly narrow. '" 1° The Supreme Court
has been extremely cautious when addressing constitutional claims in the
immigration context stating, "immigration is a sovereign prerogative,
largely within the control of the executive and the legislature. "101 Another
contributing factor is that the BIA does not have the authority to rule10 2on the
constitutionality of the statutes and regulations that they administer.
With circuit courts trending towards deference to hundreds of years
of precedent in support of a categorical approach, there is a distinct
possibility that the Supreme Court may finally give a directed opinion on
whether courts may examine evidence outside the record of conviction
when, after applying a modified categorical approach and ambiguity still
exists, a CIMT has occurred. 103 However, the Supreme Court will likely
not consider the issue ripe until significant immigration 0reform
occurs with
4
1
CIMTs.
of
realm
the
change
completely
to
the potential
The discord between criminal defense attorneys and immigration
counsel is also not a new problem, however, modem immigration reform
makes the consequences more severe and the benefits of "good moral
character" more appealing. 10 5 The Deferred Action for Childhood

statute is divisible).
98 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing relevant holdings).
99See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
100United States v. Barajas-Guillen, 632 F.2d 749, 752 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing limited
scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation).
101See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (citing long history of Supreme Court

decisions finding same).
102

See In re Salazar-Regino, 23 1. & N. Dec. 223, 231 (B.I.A.2002) (indicating BIA cannot

supersede Supreme Court rulings); In re Rodriguez-Carrillo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1031, 1035 (B.I.A.
1999) (maintaining congress handles legislation not BIA).
103 Cf supra Part III.A (listing circuit courts following trend against Silva-Trevino approach).
104

See supra note 68 and accompanying text (admitting Supreme Court will not create new

precedent until issue becomes more pressing).
105 See Immigr. Act of 1990 Today, National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers
Guild § 12:27, Abolition of judicial recommendations against deportation (updated Sept. 2014)
(focusing on efforts immigration attorneys must make when advocating for noncitizens).
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Arrivals, 10 6 a memorandum authorized by the Obama Administration,
allows aliens under age thirty, provided they meet certain requirements, to
live and work in the United States for a period of two years and after two
years, may re-apply for an additional two-year period. 10 7 However, these
conditions stipulate that you are not qualified to receive protection against
deportation if you obtain a conviction of a felony offense, a significant
misdemeanor offense, or multiple misdemeanor offenses. 108 This implies
that even crimes that do not constitute CIMTs can have negative
deportation consequences if not properly advised by counsel. 0 9
Often times, immigration practitioners do not get involved until
after a judgment has been entered, which may be too late to effectively halt
deportation proceedings. 110 Notably, while Padilla held that the Sixth
Amendment requires defense counsel to advise noncitizen defendants about
the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, it did not discuss how to
address the possibility of determining authority being able to inquire
beyond the record of conviction."' The circumstances in Padilla surround
a high-volume drug trafficking case where the inevitability of deportation
was high despite the plea negotiated.1 2 However, more often than not,
aliens are convicted of minor crimes, which may still constitute a CIMT
after going through a categorical analysis."' When aliens are charged with
minor crimes with a strong likelihood of obtaining a plea bargain,
incorporating immigration considerations is paramount. 114
With ninety-four percent of all state convictions arising from guilty

106

See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, DHS, to David V. Aguilar, Acting

Comm'r, CBP, Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., USCIS, and John Morton, Dir., ICE, Exercising
ProsecutorialDiscretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the UnitedStates as Children

(June 15, 2012) (detailing why children brought to United States should be subject to
prosecutorial discretion in deportation).
107 See id. (justifying why prosecutorial discretion should apply to younger noncitizens).
108See id. (noting severity of offense does not allow for any prosecution).
109 See Jenny Roberts, Crashingthe Mlisdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1089,
1098 (2013) (indicating plea bargains for misdemeanors have impact on good moral character
considerations for citizenship).
110See Immigr. Act of 1990 Today, supra note 105 (emphasizing immigration lawyers must
advise clients regarding deportation consequences).
111 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 377-78 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (highlighting
difficulties faced by defense counsel when noncitizen clients face deportation).
112 See id. at 362-63 (noting drug trafficking crimes generally trigger deportation due to
nature of offense).
113

See Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain Crisisfor Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34

CARDOZO L. REv. 1751, 1808 (2013) (discussing inherent unfairness in classifying misdemeanors
as CIMTs allowing for deportation).
114 See id. at 1781-85 (noting counsel's misguided efforts to have noncitizen clients accept
plea deals while creating deportation implications).
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pleas, protecting a defendant's benefit from the plea bargain is a critical
concern behind using the modified categorical approach. 11 5 Honoring a
plea bargain is, and should continue to be, a core concern in upholding the
application of the two-step categorical
approach and refusing to look
6
beyond the record of conviction."
While a clear definition of how to handle CIMTs may never be
achieved, legislative reform regarding the repercussions of such a finding
may be achievable." 7 An all-inclusive list of what crimes constitute a
CIMT and how to make such a determination is quite possibly impossible;
therefore, Congress should consider eliminating deportation as a
consequence for misdemeanor offenses." 8 This would incentivize aliens
who are facing the possibility of deportation as a result of a conviction to
accept plea bargains rather than going to trial on the advice of counsel and
save the criminal court system precious resources such as time and
money.1 9 As the intersections between criminal and immigration courts
continue to increase, Congress should also consider the possibility of
judicial recommendations as part of plea bargains for misdemeanor
offenses, especially those which do not require the appointment of
counsel.20

115

Cf Analyzing Washington General Assault ConvictionsAfter Moncrieffe, Decamps, and

Olivas-Motta: An Overview Guide for Immigration Counsel, WASH. DEFENDER ASS'N 4 (Aug. 1,

2013),
http://www.defensenet.org/imnmigration-project/imnmigration-resources/moncrieffedescamps-analysis-for-imnmigration-attorneys/AILAWA%20Post/o2OMoncrieffe%200o20Descamps%/o20Assault%20 Crimeso20Advisoryo20%208-

1-13.pdf (discussing how importance of preserving benefit of bargain played significant role in
modified categorical approach). The Advisory also discusses how the act of a plea agreement is
contractual by nature. Id.("Just as the defendant chooses rationally to avoid the risk of
conviction at trial, the prosecution avoids testing its evidence before a jury.").
116 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601-02 (1990) ("[I]n cases where the
defendant pleaded guilty, there often is no record of the underlying facts. Even if the
Government were able to prove those facts, if a guilty plea to a lesser, non burglary offense was
the result of a plea bargain, it would seem unfair to impose a sentence enhancement as if the
defendant had pleaded guilty to burglary.").
117 See Cade, supra note 113, at 1812 (discussing possibilities to alternative reform for CIMT
consequences).
118See id.at 1812 (proposing elimination of deportation as consequence will promote
general fairness).
119See Roberts, supra note 109, at 1099-1100 (arguing if more misdemeanor defendants
choose trial over guilty pleas system would internalize costs of prosecutions).
120 See Cade, supra note 113, at 1812 (discussing possibilities to alternative reform for CIMVT
consequences).
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V. CONCLUSION

Disuniformity is inevitable in immigration law due to the
procedural requirements under administrative law and the variability of
state criminal statutes between jurisdictions. Despite the importance of a
unified application of the law, we must have faith in the judicial system's
ability to reason through these issues, such as how to best determine what
constitutes a CIMT to in order to serve the needs of noncitizens. Courts
continue to reference in their decisions that if Congress wanted to have a
precise definition of a CIMT, they would amend the statute. However,
Congress's input will likely never occur since immigration reform is so
controversial amongst constituents. It is very possible that another hundred
years will pass and there will still not be a hard and fast answer on how to
address CIMTs. In the interim, application of a strict categorical approach
will rightfully restrain the prosecutorial abilities of the BIA and prevent the
over expenditure of resources on the increasing number of deportable
aliens by disallowing examination of facts outside the record of conviction.
JuliaMyers

